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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

RAYMOND C. HANSEN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

MARY J. HANSEN,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
13985

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The defendant-appellant, Mary J. Hansen, appeals
from the Decree of Divorce entered against her in the
Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, State of
Utah, the Honorable George E. Ballif, Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The lower court found grounds for divorce pursuant
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2
to Section 30-3-1, U. C. A. (1953), as amended, and entered a Decree of Divorce against the defendant-appellant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-appellant seeks a reversal of the Decree
of Divorce, or in the alternative, an increase in the amount
of alimony payment awarded to defendant-appellant.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife,
having been married at Nephi, Utah on July 21, 1939
(TR. 3). There are no minor children as issue of this
marriage (TR. 3). Plaintiff is a retired Naval officer
(TR. 45).
On or about August 24, 1972, defendant was awarded
a Decree of Separate Maintenance against plaintiff (TR.
5). Defendant was awarded the payments from the California home and $30 a month alimony (TR. 5).
The parties have not lived together for many months
prior to the Decree of Separate Maintenance nor have
they lived together since that date (TR. 5).
Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that defendant had
treated him cruelly (TR. 3). The incidents upon which
he based his allegations were: (1) disagreemeot as to
who should pay the income taxes on payments received
from the sale of their home in California (Trial Trans.
7); (2) disagreement as to who should pay the property
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taxes on the California home (Trial Trans. 12); (3) discussions as to the re-payment to plaintiff for an automobile plaintiff purchased for his son (Trial Transcript 13);
(4) disagreements as to who should be able to authorize
the sale of the California home (Trial Trans. 18); (5)
alienating affections of children and grandchildren (Trial
Trans. 21); (6) repairing of air conditioning in defendant's trailer home (Trial Trans. 21); and (7) repairing
water pipes in defendant's trailer home (Trial Trans.
22).
Testimony of a psychiatrist was offered by plaintiff
to show that the above incidents caused him great mental
distress. However, defendant's supposed acts were not
shown to be the cause of such distress (TR. 44, Trial
Trans. 38-39).
On July 20, 1974, the lower court granted plaintiff
a Decree of Divorce (TR. 50-52). Defendant was awarded
the $130 monthly payment from the sale of their California home and $30 monthly alimony. Defendant was
ordered to post a $1000 cash bond to insure payments
of a Blue Cross-Blue Shield health insurance premium
(TR. 50-52).
Defendant filed a Motion to Amend and Supplement
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law due to the
fact that defendant's monthly bills for medicine were
nearly $100. Under the Navy Champus Program, defendant was entitled to free medication and hospitalization
(TR. 63). Defendant further contended that the Blue
Cross-Blue Shield program ordered by the Court as a

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
substitute for the Champus program was much inferior
(TR. 63).
Dr. Renzetti, Head, Pulmonary Disease Division,
College of Medicine, University of Utah Medical Center,
verified that defendant suffered from bronchiectasis and
bronchial asthma and that her condition was worsening
(TR. 73-74). Stone Drug verified that cost of defendant's
medication alone would be approximately $70 per month
(TR. 74).
An Amended Decree of Divorce was entered and defendant granted $70 per month for alimony, along with
the provisions of the original Decree of Divorce (TR.
75-77).
A timely Notice of Appeal was filed by defendant
(TR. 84).
>

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS
FINDING OF FACTS TO SUPPORT A DECREE OF DIVORCE.
Plaintiff sought and was granted a divorce decree
pursuant to Section 30-3-1(7) U. C. A. (1953), as
amended, which sets out as one of the grounds for divorce: "Cruel treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant
to the extent of causing bodily injury or great mental distress to the plaintiff." (Emphasis added.) The Court
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based its finding of cruel treatment on several incidents
which occurred since the Temporary Decree of Separate
Maintenance in August of 1972. The incidents consisted
of misunderstandingB and disagreements as to (1) who
should pay the income taxes on the $130 received from
the sale of plaintiff's and defendant's California home;
(2) who should pay the property taxes on said home;
(3) who could authorize the sale of the California home;
(4) should the son repay the plaintiff, his father, for the
car plaintiff bought him; (5) should plaintiff fix the air
conditioning and water pipes in defendant's trailer house;
and (6) general accusations that defendant was turning
the children and grandchildren against plaintiff.
The above mentioned incidents are not such as would
cause plaintiff great mental distress. In fact, no proof
was made that any great mental distress was, in fact,
caused by said incidents. In fact, the incidents do not
represent anything more than the natural and usual disagreements and misunderstandings that accompany any
normal marriage.
This Court has long held that the incidents of cruelty
must be aggravated when asserted by the husband as
grounds for divorce. In Hyrup v. Hyrup, 66 Utah 580, 245
Pac. 335 (1926), this Court stated:
"We think the evidence of the wife's conduct in
this case fails to establish legal cruelty within
the definition of the statute and the policy of the
law. In Doe v. Doe, 48 Utah 200, 158 Pac. 781,
this Court, in dealing with the subject of the
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wife's cruelty to the husband causing him great
mental distress, said:
The adjudged cases show that courts, on
the ground of cruelty, grant the wife a decree
on much less evidence than they do the husband.
. . . Before a decree is granted the husband on
such ground, it ought to be a somewhat aggravated case." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 337.
Each particular case must be viewed separately considering the alleged incidents of cruelty and the character
of the individual claiming such cruelty. Scheibe, 57
C. A. 2d 336, 134 P. 2d 835 (1943). In our case it is the
husband who is claiming great mental distress. However,
great mental distress cannot be based on a few enumerated disagreements between the plaintiff-husband and defendant-wife. Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 120 Mont. 190, 182
P. 2d 477 (1947). The incidents, as complained of by
plaintiff, do not represent cruel treatment such as would
cause great mental distress. A husband's feelings are less
easily hurt because of his character, refinement, intelligence, and delicacy of sentiment. Scheibe, supra. Plaintiff is a retired Naval Officer. Certainly these minor
incidents would not cause great mental distress to a person of plaintiff's background. He is surely accustomed to
disagreements, having been a Naval officer. And as
pointed out by the Utah Court in Hyrup supra, there
being no aggravated case proven, the defendant-wife's
conduct in this case fails to establish cruel treatment
causing great mental distress.
Not only are the incidents raised by plaintiff insuf-
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ficient to warrant a divorce for cruel treatment, but they
were never proven to have caused mental distress to the
plaintiff. Causation is essential. Farrand v. Farrand, 77
C. A. 2d 840, 176 P. 2d 773 (1947). Plaintiff has failed
to carry his burden of proof in this case. The testimony
offered by plaintiff's psychiatrist only established that
plaintiff suffered from mental anguish. No causation between the incidents and plaintiff's mental distress was
established.
"It is not enough that they both desire a divorce
or refuse to live with each other. Courts are not
authorized to grant divorces except for the particular causes prescribed by law, and then only
when the grounds or cause for divorce is proved
by substantial and satisfactory evidence" (Emphasis added.) (Hyrup at 338.)
This Court has reiterated that a divorce may be granted
only for the particular causes enumerated in Section
30-3-1 U. C. A. (1953), as amended, and then only if the
cause is proved. Such is not the case here. The incidents,
as enumerated by plaintiff, were never shown to be the
cause of plaintiff's mental anguish. In fact, the only testimony presented was plaintiff's own testimony that he
suffered great mental distress. Surely this cannot be
considered "substantial and satisfactory evidence," as required in Hyrup, supra.
The lower court may have considered the grounds
for divorce met since the plaintiff and defendant had
been living apart, coupled with the disagreements they
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have had. However, this Court has been very strict in
requiring that the statutory requirements for divorce be
met. In Holman v. Holman, 94 Utah 300, 77 P. 2d 329
(1938), this court stated:
". . . But the Legislature has laid down grounds
on which divorce may be granted. They must
be present. The mere drifting apart because of
failure to synchronize interests or ambitions is
no ground for a divorce although it may be that
the parties cannot and should not be compelled
to live together . . ." (Emphasis added.) Id. at
330.
The grounds for divorce under Section 30-3-1 (7) U. C. A.
(1953), as amended, are not present. No cruel treatment
that would cause great mental distress has been shown.
Although they are living apart under an Order of Separate
Maintenance, and they have had minor disagreements,
the statutory requirements for divorce have not been met.
As stated in Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212 P. 2d
194 (1949):
". . . The fact that the parties do not care to
live together is not, per se, a reason for the
granting of a divorce, though it might be a reason
for their living apart and may be a sufficient
basis for an action for separate maintenance
. . ." Id. at 198.
The fact that plaintiff and defendant do not care to live
together, though perhaps grounds for separate maintenance, are not grounds for divorce. The incidents enumerated by plaintiff do not constitute "cruel treatment"
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that would cause "great mental distress." Plaintiff, as
husband, must prove a more aggravated case than would
a wife. He has failed to do so. Therefore, the divorce
decree should be reversed.
POINT II.
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE AMOUNT OF ALIMONY
AWARDED.
Defendant argues in the alternative, that if this Court
upholds the Decree of Divorce entered by the lower court,
then this Court should increase the monthly alimony
award from the present $70 to $100. Pursuant to Friedli
v. Friedli, 65 Utah 605, 238 Pac. 647 (1925), and Blair
v. Blair, 40 Utah 306, 121 Pac. 19 (1912), this Court has
the right to correct the alimony award payment which
is grossly inadequate and unjust.
Defendant is suffering from bronchiectasis and bronchial asthma. Her monthly medical expense just for
drugs was set at $70 in November, 1974. The cost of such
drugs has and will rise even more. Defendant is also required to make periodic visits to the hospital for examination. In the deposition taken from Dr. Attillis D.
Renzetti on June 20, 1972, at page 9, he testified that
defendant might require one week to ten days hospitalization every two years. This could cost well over $1000.
While married to plaintiff, defendant is entitled to
free medical treatment and drugs from a military installa-
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tion under the CHAMPUS PROGRAM. The lower court
in its Decree of Divorce required plaintiff to obtain medical coverage under a Blue Cross-Blue Shield Plan. It also
required plaintiff to post a $1000 cash bond to secure
payment of the premiums on the policy. However, defendant argues on appeal that the Blue Cross-Blue Shield
Plan is grossly inadequate as compared to the CHAMPUS Program.
A comparison of the two policies on a per year basis
follows:
CHAMPUS

BLUE CROSSBLUE SHIELD

In-Patient Hospital Benefits
1. Unlimited use of military 1. B e n e f i t s are paid on
hospitals free of charge.
enumerated types of care.
2. Civilian hospitals - un- 2. Listed benefits are paid in
limited eligibility for hosfull after $100 deductible
pital use. Champus pays
per calendar admission.
75% of cost, patient pays
25%.
Out-Patinet Drugs
1. Completely free at a 1. Major medical coverage military hospital or drug
$1,000 deductible per calstore.
endar year, then 100%
coverage.
2. In a civilian drug store,
$50 deductible per year,
then 75% coverage.
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Out-Patient Care (office calls)
1. Completely free f r o m 1. Major medical coverage military doctors and hos$1,000 deductible per calpital.
endar year, then 100%
coverage.
2. Under civilian care, $50
deductible per year, then
75% coverage.
Psychiatric or Mental Care (Nervous Disorders)
1. Completely free f r o m 1. Major medical coverage military hospital or doc$1,000 deductible per caltor.
endar year, then 50% of
reasonable costs up to
$1,500 per calendar year.
2. Under civilian d o c t o r ,
75% coverage.
Physical, Speech or Occupational Therapy
1. Completely free f r o m 1. Maximum of $200 per
military therapists.
year.
2. Under civilian therapists,
75% of unlimited coverage.
Dental
1. 75% coverage of dental 1. No dental care.
care with authorization.
Cost

1. No cost.

1. Up to
age 55 - $309.60 per year
55 - 59 - $336.00 per year
60 - 64 - $362.40 per year
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The above comparison demonstrates the inadequacy
of the Blue Cross-Blue Shield program. Examining the
defendant's costs under e^tch program for her "typical
year" would yield the following results:
Basis:

$1,000 for drugs
$1,000 for hospitalization care

CHAMPUS

BLUE CROSSBLUE SHIELD
Result: Defendant would Result: Defendant w o u l d
have no charge at a mili- pay first $1,000. Remainder
tary installation. At a ci- would be covered,
vilian hospital and drug
store she would pay $250
for hospital care and $286
for drugs ($50 deductible
plus 25% of remainder),
totaling $536.
Thus it may be seen that defendant would be required to pay nearly twice as much per year under the
Blue Cross-Blue Shield plan. This is excluding the costs
for premiums.
Therefore, if this Court; does uphold the lower court's
Decree of Divorce, defendant argues in the alternative
that the amount of alimony awarded in said decree ($70)
is inadequate, and the trial court abused its discretion.
The Blue Cross-Blue Shield policy would cost defendant
$1,000 per year, plus the cost of premiums if plaintiff does
not pay for them for the rest of defendant's life. The
award should be increased to $100 per month, to meet
that extra cost of said policy.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the above arguments, the lower court erred
in granting plaintiff a Decree of Divorce. In the alternative, if the Decree of Divorce is upheld, defendant contends that the lower court abused its discretion in the
amount of alimony awarded, and said amount should be
increased to $100 per month.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD M. TAYLOR
Attorney for
Defendant-Appellant
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